Malaysia's next 50 years: Domestic ethnocratic concerns
(Geoff Wade is a historian with interests in China-Southeast Asian historical interactions and comparative historiography. His basic degree is in Asian Studies from the Australian National University while his PhD (History) is from the University of Hong Kong. He also undertook Chinese studies in Sydney, Beijing and Nanjing.
Following a stint teaching history at Universiti Sains Malaysia, he has been coordinating the China-ASEAN Project at the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong for the last six years)
Written by Geoffrey Wade, The Interpreter
The MH370 tragedy has left us with many enigmas, but it has also revealed to the world a fact Malaysians have always known: an administration produced by an ethnocratic system will be mediocre or incompetent. In trying to understand how and why Malaysia operates as it does, it is essential to look back 50 years, to the origins of the modern state, and to the apartheid system which has been gradually erected since 1963.
The year 2013 marked the 50th anniversary of the creation of Malaysia. This unexpected nation brought together British possessions and protectorates in the Thai/Malay peninsula with those in northern Borneo. In the process by which Malaysia was created, two key aspects of the new state were greatly contentious. These two aspects continue to cast a long shadow over this nation and they are increasingly presenting dangers both domestically and regionally.
The first aspect relates to the nature of the polity itself.
By bringing together the states of the peninsula (Singapore, Melaka and Penang and the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak) as the new Malaysia, the British aimed at dealing with all of their leftover colonies in Southeast Asia in one fell swoop. By ensuring that Sabah and Sarawak did not seek
independence and instead became dependent on and subordinate to Kuala Lumpur, the British Cold War strategy of creating a Western-oriented bulwark across the middle of Southeast Asia was achieved.
This relationship of dependence and subordination of Sabah and Sarawak to Kuala Lumpur has, however, been a cause of dissatisfaction ever since. Originally proclaimed as equal partners in the new nation, the two Bornean states have been continually exploited for their oil and timber resources, fiscal allocations (they are given 5% of the oil and gas revenues they produce) and their representation in the federal parliament. This exploitation has been exacerbated by the corruption of those, such as Taib Mahmud, who were assigned fiefdoms in the Bornean states by Kuala Lumpur.
The second contentious aspect in the creation of Malaysia is the racial structure of political power and social representation.
In 1947, the British annulled the Malayan Union which they had created post-war and which had provided equal citizenship to all peninsula residents. In its place they instituted a system where the feudal rulers were strengthened and Malays were assigned a special position under the constitution. Louis Mountbatten presciently wrote to the Colonial Office at the time that “I cannot help feeling that in the long run nothing could perhaps do more to perpetuate sectional antagonisms, to the risk of which you pointedly refer in your letter, than the giving of special recognition to one race.” It was this provision for the privileged position of the Malays which was incorporated within the 1948
Constitution of the Federation of Malaya and subsequently in the Malaysian constitution of 1963.
Mountbatten's concerns have been vindicated by history, with a resultant ethnocracy being pursued on the basis of the constitutional provisions and the New Economic Policy instituted since the 1970s. These practices have seen non-Malays essentially excluded from government positions, judicial appointments,
diplomatic postings, military careers and, increasingly, tertiary education. The public sector has been essentially purged of non-Malays, with even the respected Kelantan prince Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah asking “Where have all the non-Malays gone?”
The ethnic divide is widening, with continuing efforts by the Government to increase the Islamic portion of the Malaysian population and reduce the non-Malay elements of society. Former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim suggested last year that a 'secretive task force' existed under the National Security Council, which is responsible for arbitrarily granting Malaysian citizenship to Muslims from other countries. Through these policies of apartheid, non-Malays (some 30% of the population) have essentially been made non-citizens.
Prime Minister Najib Razak has done little to redress the growing divisions and social inequalities between communities within Malaysia except to promote his derided 1Malaysia initiative. The speciousness of the program was revealed in late 2013 when Najib announced a new raft of advantageous policies for the Malay constituency. Meanwhile, his deputy happily declares himself 'Malay first and Malaysian second.'
The apparent powerlessness of Najib in the face of increasingly intense Malay politicking suggests that his tenure will not extend too far into the future. The resignation of the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) chairman P Waytha Moorthy from his position as deputy minister in the Prime Minister's Department has further undermined Najib's position. In addition, the United Malays National Organisation (Umno) has
pursued the elimination of key opposition figures such as Karpal Singh and Anwar Ibrahim through the Umno-controlled courts. These actions suggest an administration in grave crisis.
Radical Malay nationalist groups such as Perkasa and Pekida continue to enjoy high level support from government, while dangerous new pseudo theories of Malay origins and current circumstance propose that the people of Chinese descent in Malaysia are part of a long term southward invasion targeted at Malays.
The increasingly divisive dispute between Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia over the use of the term 'Allah' has further incited sentiments nationwide, while discussion of the extension of hudud laws to non-Muslims has also induced concerns among much of society. Recent events have, through their nature and intensity, led some observers to suggest the imminent demise of democratic constitutionalism in Malaysia, and the growing potential for ethnic violence. The parlous state of the Malaysian press is also attracting wide attention, as is the continuing decline in the quality of education in Malaysia. None of these
issues can be discussed in isolation from the systemic racial discrimination which has marked the Malaysian administration intensely since 1969.
These burgeoning domestic crises within the Malaysian polity have major significance for regional stability and great power relations.
The exclusion of non-Malays from virtually every aspect of public life in Malaysia and the increasing dissatisfaction of Malaysians in the Bornean states with Kuala Lumpur are not simply domestic matters. Neighbouring states and global powers are closely watching the evolution of the Malaysian polity as it moves further towards crisis. As the US and China spar for influence in the region, a dislocating Malaysia will offer them either threat or opportunity.
What do these diverse and increasingly intractable problems within Malaysia mean for regional stability and for major power relations in Southeast Asia?
Asean, with its long-standing policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of members, portrays Malaysia as a fulcrum, connecting maritime and mainland parts of Southeast Asia. However, within and among Asean states, there are all sorts of softly spoken concerns about Malaysia's domestic contradictions. Moreover, the country is being watched closely by the major global powers because they see the country as a key fault line in the region, and recognize the possibilities of massive social and political dislocation and even disintegration resulting from the various contradictions and inequalities noted [earlier].
China has been particularly attentive to Malaysia, and Malaysian authorities seem to feel that they enjoy a 'special relationship' with the PRC.
In 2012 Malaysia dutifully returned to China a number of refugee Uighurs who had fled to Malaysia. And during the visit by President Xi Jinping to Malaysia in late 2013, bilateral relations were upgraded to a 'comprehensive strategic partnership.' Malaysia is now China's major trade partner in Asean. The two countries have established joint industrial parks in both countries and Xinhuanet recently added a Malaysia channel to its coverage. Even competing maritime claims seeming not to be a cause of concern. When the Philippines and Vietnam castigated China for its fishing bans in the South China Sea last year, Malaysia remained tactfully quiet.
China's particular interest in Sabah was noted in The Strategist last year, and during his visit to Beijing in October, Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Tun Hussein invited Chinese Defence Minister General Chang Wanquan to visit the Royal Malaysian Navy base there to initiate direct contact between Malaysia's Naval Region Command 2 and China's Southern Sea Fleet Command. This is the curtain-raiser for joint military exercises involving land, sea and air forces of both countries. Recent Chinese naval operations just off Sarawak have also attracted wide attention and some concern. However, China's anger over Malaysia's handling of the MH370 affair has produced tension between these two states, and how this will affect this year's commemoration of the 40th anniversary of their diplomatic ties remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, the US has not simply observed events.
It has a real interest in preserving Asean as a counterweight to China and in ensuring that Malaysia does not combust or divide. The US remains the largest foreign investor in Malaysia, while Malaysia continues to enjoy a healthy trade surplus with America. At the same time, the US is continuing to push Malaysia to sign on to the increasingly troubled TPP.
On the security front, the US will undoubtedly continue its surveillance of Malaysia, with the assistance of Singapore. US officials have been flying into Kuala Lumpur in droves. Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and US Trade Representative Michael Froman, for example, all visited Malaysia in October 2013, and early in 2014, US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel met with his
Malaysian counterpart Hishammuddin in Washington to discuss security cooperation.
US President Obama is due to visit Malaysia in late April, when he will seek ways to turn this fault line into a fulcrum. The only other American president to have visited Malaysia was Lyndon Johnson back in 1966, which underlines the concern which the US is now feeling in respect of Malaysia and Southeast Asia more generally.
As issues of regional security and Asean's futures are discussed, President Obama might be moved to reflect on the fact that it was the anti-apartheid movement which first brought him to political engagement. Recognizing that societies built on racist exclusion can never be stable, secure, just or long lasting, he might encourage Malaysia to seek ways to begin to redress the continuing injustices of its ethnocratic system. The contribution of such a change to social stability within the country, to the strengthening of the integrity of the Malaysian polity, and to regional security more generally, would be in everyone's interests.
This article first appeared in The Interpreter
Dr Geoff Wade is an historian who researches various aspects of Sino-Southeast Asian historical interactions over the last 1,000 years and has recently been concentrating on current interactions between Southeast Asia and China.
